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Sometime between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, a ‘Monsieur Jourdain syndrome’
seems to have spread among basic researchers and clinicians in fields as diverse as neurol-
ogy,psychology,psychiatry,behaviouralstudies,physiology,biochemistryandpharmacol-
ogy. Almost overnight, they realised that they were but neuroscientists.
1
This novel conscience was soon translated into concern for the specificity and historical
originsofthenewscience,withremarkablyconvergentresults.Afewmainfeaturesrecurred
as central to the definition of the field: the importance of technological advances; the role of
modellingpracticesinthebridgingofgapsbetweenunrelatedperspectives;theintrinsicinter-
disciplinaryandvariouslyreductionisticnatureofthefield.Mostimportant,however,seemed
to be not so much what the new multidiscipline actually was, or had been, but what it was to
become:nothinglessthanthecornerstoneofageneralunifiedsciencetocome,oneattacking
‘the ultimate goal of all science and philosophy – how does the mind/brain work!’
2
To some extent, the recent historiography of the neurosciences seems to have taken the
bulk of those claims at face value, especially as regards the concern for an appropriation of
thequestionofhumannature,behaviour andvalues,indeedof‘whatitmeans tobehuman’.
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369Legitimateastheyare,thesepicturesoftheneurosciencesfailedtotacklethehistoriographic
issueitself:thevalidityandextentof‘theneurosciences’asameaningfulhistorical/analytical
category.Quitetellingly,onecouldsay,theyhavefailedtodrawtheproperphilosophicaldis-
tinction between ‘substance’ and ‘contingency’ in the phenomenon.
The following, instead, is an attempt at approaching ‘the neurosciences’ as a contin-
gent disciplinary and, later, historiographical umbrella-definition, which at once houses
and shadows a number of relatively autonomous if historically related sets of issues,
practices and models. This might in turn help questioning the present general concept
of the neurosciences, their extension, their cultural and ideological bearing, perhaps their
epistemological hierarchy. To this end, I will use the cheap trick of inverting the focus of
the grand narrative, taking the vantage point from an animal, instead of from the science,
or the object, to exchange the contingent and the substantial.
The story I will sketch here is that of an improbable laboratory animal, Octopus vul-
garis, of how it came to cross paths with the nascent neurosciences and almost to become
a symbol of the novel approach, a model of the brain, incorporating many of the major
features and instances of the neuroscientific philosophy (search for simplified models,
focus on universal mechanisms and anthropocentric orientation). I thus wish to open a
window on the variety of, and often contradiction among, numerous disciplinary and
epistemic trajectories that were later to merge into the neurosciences.
The Evolution of a ‘Marine Guinea Pig’
A very familiar animal for those in the Mediterranean,
4 the octopus is much less so in
northern Europe and Great Britain. Nordic mythology, fishermen tales and, later, the
accounts of travelling naturalists conveyed a sense of disquiet in relation to this charm-
ing, but also voracious and aggressive, animal.
5
It took the second half of the nineteenth century, and the foundation of the first public
aquaria, for a rehabilitation of the octopus in the eyes of the mid-European and British
public. The first octopuses shown captive in England, in the mid-1800s, soon became
attractions, eliciting sympathetic curiosity for their camouflage skills and elegant pos-
tures and movements, hitting the headlines of local newspapers, and being sincerely
mourned at death.
6 It is indeed in aquaria that the mental powers of the octopus were
brought to public attention, prompting a first metamorphosis of the animal from a scary
monster into a wonder animal.
It wasn’t only children and grandparents who sanctified the transmutation. New mar-
ine stations equipped for the maintenance of living animals afforded naturalists the
chance of accessing the octopus in an environment close to its natural one, to study its
anatomy and physiology, and to gain a limited but direct acquaintance with its life in
the sea.
4See D’Arcy W. Thompson, ‘How to Catch
Cuttlefish’, The Classical Review, 42, 1 (1928), 14–18.
5Henry Lee, Aquarium Notes: The Octopus or the
‘Devil-Fish’ of Fiction and of Fact (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1875).
6Frank W. Lane, Kingdom of the Octopus:
The Life History of the Cephalopoda (London:
Jarrolds, 1957).
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mental object: its anatomical convergences with the vertebrates, great resilience to the
insults of surgery, the absence of bleeding during operation, and the ease to reach every
inner organ made it popular as a ‘marine guinea pig’.
7 On the other hand, the early
Darwinian apostles in the field of psychology – students of animal mind, and observers
of animal will – were as well exposed to, and duly impressed by, the charms and beha-
vioural variability of the cephalopod, making it object of methodical observation and
experimentation.
8
It was the juxtaposition of these two opposing ways of looking at the octopus that
paved the way for a further metamorphosis, from aquatic guinea pig to an ideal neurolo-
gical model. The double essence of a simple animal with a complex behaviour, of an
invertebrate with a vertebrate behaviour is exactly what appealed to the zoologist John
Zachary Young, when, working in the marine Zoological Station of Naples in the late
1930s, he conceived his own ambitious approach to the exploration of learning and
memory mechanisms.
Learning, Young surmised, cannot be accounted for in terms of simple neural
chains or stimulus-response schemata: it belongs to the level of the ‘whole animal’.
Given the complexity of the phenomenon and our relative ignorance of the underlying
machinery, only comparison with structures simpler than the vertebrate type could
offer concrete hopes of progress.
9 Once defined what learning, as a function of adap-
tation, meant to animals at various phylogenetic levels, one could hope that the com-
parison of the different structures involved in the same process would help to reach
an acceptable standard definition of both the phenomenon and the mechanism.
Thanks to its virtues, natural and experimental, the octopus was chosen as the first
step of a comparative project, encompassing other cephalopods, insects and even-
tually, mammals.
It took two years of intense work (1947–9) for Young and his assistant Brian Blundell
Boycott to attune the experimental system to their aims; indeed, to define what those
very aims were. The labour was divided between the Naples Station – for behavioural
experiments, based on shape discrimination and conditioning – and Young’s Institute
in London – for functional anatomy of the brain and definition of the putative ‘memory
store’ in the brain. The first full report of the experiments, ‘A Memory System in Octo-
pus vulgaris Lamarck’, appeared only in 1955, eight years after the start, but it was full
of promise.
10 The title itself spoke for the ambitiousness of the results. For the first time,
the term ‘system’ was used in relation to memory formation, pointing to well-defined
machinery, a network of individual, if connected, elements in the brain performing a
7G. Grimpe, ’Pflege, Behandlung und Zucht der
Cephalopoden fu ¨r zoologische und physiologische
Zwecke’, in E. Abderhalden (Hrg.) Handbuch der
biologischen Arbeitsmethoden (Berlin: Urban &
Schwarzenberg, 1928), 331–402: 332.
8J.A. Bierens de Haan, Animal Psychology: Its
Nature and its Problems (London: Hutchinson, 1949),
119; F.J.J. Buytendijk, ‘Das Verhalten von Octopus
nach teilweiser Zersto ¨rung des “Gehirns”’, Archives
Ne ´erlandaises de Physiologie de l’Homme et des
Animaux, 18 (1933), 24–65 .
9B.B. Boycott and J.Z. Young, ‘The Comparative
StudyofLearning’,inJ.F.DanielliandR.Brown(eds),
The Comparative Study of Learning (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1950), 432–53: 432–4.
10B.B. Boycott and J.Z. Young, ‘A Memory
System in Octopus vulgaris Lamarck’, Proceedings of
the Royal Society, B, 143 (1955), 449–80.
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371specific memory function, just like the digestive system performs digestion.
11 The net-
work had been stained and was shown, anatomically and indisputably to be composed
of ‘re-entrant circuits’ connecting the cerebral lobes.
12 To the trained eye, the structure
implied the function.
13
Within a decade, the octopus system had been refined to such a level of productivity
(on both the behavioural and the anatomical side) as to obliterate the original compara-
tive project. In the second part of the 1950s, as more and more new acolytes joined the
octopologist club, opening up new avenues of behavioural experimentation, Young con-
centrated on the anatomical side, on the networks and, especially, on the language
employed in their description. The very concept of ‘memory’ in the animal underwent
dramatic semantic shifts. Whereas in the early 1950s articles, the term ‘memory’ was
used in a phenomenological sense, as a lasting change in behaviour pointing to a puta-
tive plastic change in the brain,
14 by the 1960s, it acquired a different order of reality,
becoming a physical part of the brain, ‘much like the memory of which engineers
speak’.
15 Detailed histological work led to a specification of the ‘re-entrant circuits’
in the brain in terms of the different cellular types involved, if with some acceptable
dose of guessing.
16 Finally, the cellular architecture and the behavioural repertoire of
the simple animal were put in direct relation in a last, most-refined model of the octopus
brain: the mnemon, or memory cell, in which the innate behaviour of the animal was
reduced to attack and retreat, and rooted into the anatomical connections of different
cell types in the memory lobes. Much as it was (admittedly) tentative and rough, the
mnemon offered a plausible, general model, a behavioural/anatomical learning unit: it
told at least ‘what to look for, and where’.
17 From an epistemic thing, Young turned
the octopus memory system into a candidate technical object – a model for the brain
in general.
The shaping of the model was meaningfully paralleled by a reorientation of the
research effort from a planned comparison of learning phenomena (which had never
actually started, despite Young’s reiterated promises to his sponsors) to a deep investiga-
tion of learning structures, involving electron microscopy, intracellular recording and the
building of electronic analogues.
18 His construction of the octopus model, in terms not
merely of animals and descriptions, but also of theoretical framework and available
equipment, appealed to different epistemic communities throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Again, the picture of a simple animal with a complex behaviour proved an essen-
tial element of the octopus’ fortune as a candidate model system. Biophysicists, physiol-
ogists, psychologists and zoologists alike, as well as charities and the US Air Force,
11R.L. Buckner, ‘Memory Systems: An Incentive,
Not an End Point’, in Henry L. Roediger, Yadin
Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick (eds), Science of
Memory: Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 359–64.
12Boycott and Young, op. cit. (note 10).
13J.Z. Young, unpublished autobiographical
sketch (1992). I thank Dr Antony Boycott for sharing
the typescript with me.
14Boycott and Young, op. cit. (note 9); J.Z.
Young, ‘Growth and Plasticity in the Nervous
System: Ferrier Lecture, Delivered on June 28th,
1950’, Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, 139
(1951), 18–37; Boycott and Young, op. cit. (note 10).
15J.Z. Young, ‘Learning and Discrimination in
the Octopus’, Biological Reviews, 36 (1961), 32–96:
33–4.
16J.Z. Young, A Model of the Brain (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1964).
17J.Z. Young, The Memory System of the Brain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 7.
18Young, op. cit. (note 16), 299–323.
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international biology.
In this crowding are probably also to be found the reasons of the decline of Young’s
octopod model for the brain. Whereas, in the earliest phase of the work, the job was mas-
tered and controlled by a limited and organised community, sharing a system of relations
and loyalties as well as a vocabulary, a set of problems and instruments developed with
time and experience, the inclusion of ‘external’ players jeopardised the simple model at
all levels, from the management of the resources to the adequacy of the protocols, of the
descriptions, of the assumptions. The re-entrant circuits, so seductively clear in the Nissl
stains of the brain slices, were never proven to physiologically behave as such, and this
because, to the desperation of the most refined electrode experts, the octopus and its
brain just did not allow for the implant to work, as the more complicated invertebrates
did.
19 At a different level, and despite the great effort at refining both the instrumentation
and the procedures, the behavioural side of the model was increasingly criticised as sim-
plistic, and its value as a viable mechanical–anatomical model for ‘learning’ questioned.
As one of the main critics of the octopus model, Geoff Bittermann, said in 1960, ‘As a
working hypothesis, the proposition that learning is the same in all animals led to the
study of many animals. As an article of faith...to concentration on one.’
20 Nevertheless,
the octopus model of learning mechanisms survived the wave of criticism of the mid-
1960s. The way in which this happened is meaningful. The octopus as an actual experi-
mental system – as conceived by Young and Boycott in the late 1940s – underwent a
long eclipse after Young’s retirement and, despite some attempts at reviving it in the
early 1980s, was never resumed at the same level of complexity and ambition.
What remained, and proved very influential indeed, was the octopus model, the set of
insights, guiding hypotheses and rhetoric devices that had been developed in the previous
decades. The issue of simplification, of ‘simple systems’, for instance, had emerged in the
1960s as the key frontier of the study of brains and behaviours, and one requiring the
mobilisation of cohorts of experts (zoologists, comparative anatomists, comparative
psychologists) not usually associated with the common notion of ‘the neurosciences’.
Still, the cross fertilisation of different fields is only part of the story. The other part
speaks of, at times, widely diverging perspectives and agendas competing on the same
ground, if at different levels – epistemic, economic, symbolic – with inevitably resulting
epistemological hierarchies. A cursory consideration of the outcomes of the Decade of the
Brain should suffice to convince us of how the medically oriented, anthropocentric
agenda of today’s neuroscience has obliterated its multifaceted and varied origins. As
the comparative neurologist Theodore H. Bullock put it in the 1980s: ‘Neuroscience is
part of biology, more specifically of zoology, and it suffers tunnel vision unless continu-
ous with ethology, ecology, and evolution.’
21 This plea, from a major actor in the defini-
tion of ‘the neurosciences’ qua academic discipline, can be seen as an epitome of our
story of a temporary model of the brain: a story of the coalescence of diverging and,
19B.B. Boycott, et al., ‘Octopus Optic Responses’,
Experimental Neurology, 12, 3 (1965), 247–56.
20M.E. Bittermann, ‘Toward a Comparative
Psychology of Learning’, American Psychologist, 15,
11 (1960), 704–12: 705.
21T.H. Bullock, ‘Comparative Neuroscience
Holds Promise for Quiet Revolutions’, Science, 225,
4661 (1984), 473–8: 474.
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defined problem. A shift of the historical gaze from the Leviathan-discipline of the
Leviathan-brain to the many, variable monads – experimental systems, research pro-
grammes, animals, politics – that are at once single parts and unique representations of
the monstre-science called ‘the neurosciences’ would probably reconcile us with the
(trivially, intrinsically) contingent dimension of the ‘ultimate science’ and of its unique,
incomparable object – and would help us focus our attention on more concrete and funda-
mental, if less evident and spectacular, underlying processes and cultural battlegrounds.
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